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Application of Formal Verification to the Lane Change Module of an
Autonomous Vehicle
Anton Zita1, Sahar Mohajerani1,2, Martin Fabian2
Abstract—For autonomous vehicles correct behavior is of
the utmost importance, as unexpected incorrect behavior can
have catastrophic outcomes. However, as with any large-scale
software development, it is not easy to get the system correct.
As the system is made up of multiple sub-modules that interact
with each other, unexpected behavior can arise from incorrect
interactions when one module may have unfulfilled expectations
on the other. This paper describes how formal verification was
applied to the lane change module of the decision and control
software (under development) for an autonomous vehicle. The
module was manually modelled as an extended finite-state
machine, as were some of the requirements. When applying
the Supremica software to perform the formal verification, some
bugs were discovered in the model. Setting up additional unit
tests triggering the incorrect behavior showed that this behavior
was also present within the actual code. For some of the errors,
applied corrections resulted in the absence of the particular
error, thus demonstrating the power of true formal verification.
Index Terms—Extended finite-state machines, Model check-
ing, Non-blocking, Compositional verification, Supervisory con-
trol theory, Discrete event systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
When implementing complex software systems, typically
with multiple interacting sub-modules, even highly skilled
programmers may introduce logical errors. Thus, especially
for safety critical systems it is important to find and eliminate
errors before they propagate into the implementation. This
calls for tools to support the programmers.
One way of trying to eliminate logical errors is to use
formal verification. This means to create a formal model
of the system, and use mathematically proven methods to
find errors. These types of formal methods [1] can show not
only presence, but also absence of logical errors according
to a given specification, assuming that the models capture
the desired behavior in enough detail. However, formal
verification has not yet found its place in industry to any
significant extent, and it is still an active field of research.
One example of safety-critical software can be found
in the automotive industry, which is rapidly moving to-
wards autonomous vehicles that are capable of maneuvering
themselves without any human input. Most of the major
car companies are developing self-driving cars for the near
future. To be able to drive autonomously, the vehicles are
equipped with a number of different sensors to gather data
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about their surroundings. This data is then processed on-
board, and depending on the current situation the software
takes different actions. Since the vehicles will be in real
traffic, software problems could potentially be disastrous, and
great effort is therefore made to guarantee the correctness of
the system.
Guaranteeing correctness is not easy, though. The vehicles
operate within an unpredictable environment and creating
test cases to cover all possible scenarios is impossible. As
noted by [2], if a fleet of 100 autonomous vehicles drives
24 hours/day, 365 days/year, at an average speed of 25 mph,
it takes 400 years to demonstrate with 95% confidence that
their failure rate is 20% better than the human driver failure
rate of 1.09 fatalities per 100 million miles (US, 2013).
To further illustrate this, in 2007, CalTech built an au-
tonomous car for the DARPA Urban Challenge [3], named
Alice. All the participant’s vehicles were required to navi-
gate through an urban-like environment. The tasks included
parking, driving while adhering all traffic safety, etc. In part
of the route during the competition Alice’s behaviour was
unsafe and almost led to a collision. After examination it was
discovered that the reason for the failure was bad interactions
between the reactive obstacle avoidance subsystem and the
reacting path planner. This failure only happened in a very
specific situation and no matter how many test cases were
designed, it was very unlikely for the bug to be found [4].
One of the leading companies in autonomous driving is
Volvo Car Corporation, VCC. VCC has an ongoing project
called DriveMe. In this project a number of XC90’s with
autonomous driving capability will be launched to VCC-
customers in 2017, to drive autonomously on some of the
main roads around Gothenburg. Within this project, formal
verification techniques were applied on a small part of the
DriveMe software to show that this could indeed help in
raising the confidence of code correctness. For this, the
existing MATLAB [5] code was manually translated into
Extended Finite State Machines (EFSM) [6], [7], which were
then loaded into the formal verification (and synthesis) tool
Supremica [8]–[10]. Existing verification techniques [11]
were then applied to check whether the EFSM was able to
reach any bad states, which would signify not fulfilling the
given specifications. As it turned out, such bad states were
found.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II collects the
preliminary background of EFSMs, and Section III illustrates
by an example how source code can be modeled in the EFSM
formalism. Then, Section IV gives an overview of the overall
system together with the model of it. Section V then presents
two specifications that the systems should fulfill. The actual
verification process is then described in Section VI where
also the found errors are discussed. The paper concludes with
Section VII where things are summed up and some future
work is suggested.
II. PRELIMINARIES
For modeling the kind of logical behavior dealt with
here, where continuous dynamics can be disregarded and
floating point data is used mainly for comparisons, it is
beneficial to think in terms of states and events, where states
represent situations where certain properties hold, and events
are associated to transitions between the states that effect
changes of those properties. A typical formalism for this is
finite-state machines (FSM) [12], [13].
A. Extended Finite-State Machines
Extended finite-state machines (EFSM) are similar to con-
ventional finite-state machines, but augmented with updates
associated to the transitions [6], [7]; formulas constructed
from variables, integer constants, the Boolean literals true
and false, and the usual arithmetic and logic connectives.
A variable v is an entity associated with a bounded
discrete domain dom(v) and an initial value v◦ ∈ dom(v).
Let V = {v0, . . . , vn} be the set of variables with do-
main dom(V ) = dom(v0) × · · · × dom(vn). An element
of dom(V ) is called a valuation and is denoted by vˆ =
(vˆ0, . . . , vˆn) with vˆi ∈ dom(vi), and the value associated to
variable vi ∈ V is denoted vˆ[vi] = vˆi. The initial valuation
is v◦ = (v◦0 , . . . , v
◦
n).
A second set of variables, called next-state variables,
denoted by V ′ = { v′ | v ∈ V } with dom(V ′) = dom(V ),
is used to describe the values of the variables after execution
of a transition. Variables in V are referred to as current-state
variables to differentiate them from the next-state variables
in V ′. The set of all update formulas using variables in V
and V ′ is denoted by ΠV .
For an update p ∈ ΠV , the terms vars(p) and vars
′(p)
denote the sets of all variables, and all next-state variables,
respectively, that occur in p. For example, if p ≡ x′ = y+1
then vars(p) = {x, y} and vars′(p) = {x}. Here and in the
following, the relation≡ denotes syntactic identity of updates
to avoid ambiguity when an update contains the equality
symbol =. An update p without any next-state variables,
vars′(p) = ∅, is called a pure guard.
One way to rewrite updates is substitution, which performs
syntactic replacement of subformulas.
Definition 1: A substitution is a mapping [z1 7→
a1, . . . , zn 7→ an] that maps variables zi to terms ai.
Given an update p ∈ ΠV , the substitution instance p[z1 7→
a1, . . . , zn 7→ an] is the update obtained from p by simulta-
neously replacing each occurrence of zi by ai.
For example, (x′ = x+ y)[x′ 7→ 1, x 7→ 0] ≡ 1 = 0 + y.
With slight abuse of notation, updates p ∈ ΠV are
also interpreted as predicates over their variables, and they
evaluate to T or F, i.e., p : dom(V )× dom(V ′) → {T,F}.
For example, if V = {x} with dom(x) = {0, 1}, then the
update p ≡ x′ = x+1 means that the value of the variable x
in the next state will be increased by 1 over its current-state
value. Its predicate p(x, x′) evaluates as p(0, 1) = T and
p(1, 1) = p(0, 0) = p(1, 0) = F
Definition 2: An extended finite-state machine (EFSM) is
a tuple E = 〈Σ, Q,→ , Q◦, Qω〉, where Σ is a set of events,
the alphabet; Q is a finite set of locations; → ⊆ Q × Σ ×
ΠV × Q is the conditional transition relation; Q
◦ ⊆ Q is
the set of initial locations; and Qω ⊆ Q is the set of marked
locations.
The expression q0
σ:p
→ q1 denotes the presence of a
transition in E, from location q0 to location q1 with event
σ and update p. Such a transition can occur if the EFSM is
in location q0 and the update p evaluates to T, and when
the transition occurs, the EFSM changes its location from q0
to q1 while updating the variables in vars
′(p) in accordance
with p; variables not contained in vars′(p) are unchanged.
For example, let x be a variable with domain dom(x) =
{0, . . . , 5}. A transition with update x′ = x+1 changes the
variable x by adding 1 to its current value, if it currently is
less than 5. Otherwise (if x = 5) the transition is disabled
and no update is performed. An update x = 3 disables a
transition unless x = 3 in the current state, and the value
of x in the next state is not changed. Differently, the update
x′ = 3 always enables its transition, and the value of x in
the next state is forced to be 3.
Given an EFSM E = 〈Σ, Q,→ , Q◦, Qω〉, its variable set
is vars(E) =
⋃
(q0,σ,p,q1)∈→ vars(p), and it contains all the
variables that appear on some transitions of E.
Usually, EFSM models consist of several interacting com-
ponents. Such a model is called an EFSM system.
Definition 3: An EFSM system is a collection of interact-
ing EFSMs,
E = {E1, . . . , En} . (1)
The alphabet of the system E is ΣE =
⋃
E∈E ΣE , and the
variable set of E is vars(E) =
⋃
E∈E vars(E).
Component interaction in an EFSM systems is modeled by
synchronous composition, where shared events are executed
in a “lock-step” fashion, while non-shared events are inter-
leaved. In addition, updates of transitions labeled by shared
events are combined by conjunction.
Definition 4: Given two EFSMs E1 = 〈Σ1, Q1,→1, Q
◦
1,
Qω1 〉 and E2 = 〈Σ2, Q2,→2, Q
◦
2, Q
ω
2 〉, the synchronous
composition of E1 and E2 is E1 ‖E2 = 〈Σ1 ∪Σ2, Q1×Q2,
→, Q◦1 ×Q
◦
2, Q
ω
1 ×Q
ω
2 〉, where:
(x1, x2)
σ:p1∧p2
−−−−−→ (y1, y2) if σ ∈ Σ1 ∩ Σ2, x1
σ:p1
−−−→1 y1,
and x2
σ:p2
−−−→2 y2 ;
(x1, x2)
σ:p1
−−−→ (y1, x2) if σ ∈ Σ1 \ Σ2 and x1
σ:p1
−−−→1 y1 ;
(x1, x2)
σ:p2
−−−→ (x1, y2) if σ ∈ Σ2 \ Σ1 and x2
σ:p2
−−−→2 y2 .
Using Def. 4, the global behaviour of a system E = {E1,
. . . En} is given by E1 ‖ · · · ‖ En.
In an EFSM, the current state of the system is given by
the current location together with the current values of all
the variables. Since the variables are discrete and bounded,
1 function[out] = f1()
2 in = randi([1 5],1,1);
3 if in>3
4 out=in-1;
5 else
6 out=f2(in);
7 end
8 end
9
10 function[out]=f2(in)
11 out=in+1;
12 end
Fig. 1. MATLAB-code for the example in Section III
f1 : in
′ = randi([1 5], 1, 1)
e1 : in > 3 ∧ out
′ = in− 1
f2
e2 : out
′ = in+ 1
s0
s1
s2
M
Fig. 2. EFSM model of the MATLAB-code shown in Fig. 1. The initial
location is identified by the small arrow pointing into it, and marked
locations are shaded.
the EFSM can be flattened, which introduces states for the
combinations of locations and variable values [1].
Definition 5: Let E = 〈Σ, Q,→ , Q◦, Qω〉 be an EFSM
with variable set vars(E) = V . The monolithic flattening of
E is U(E) = 〈Σ, QU ,→U , Q
◦
U , Q
ω
U 〉 where
• QU = Q× dom(V );
• (x, vˆ)
σ
→U (y, wˆ) if E contains a transition x
σ:p
→ y such
that p(vˆ, wˆ) = T;
• Q◦U = Q
◦ × {v◦};
• QωU = Q
ω × dom(V ).
U(E) is the FSM representation of the EFSM, where all
the variables have been removed and their values vˆ embedded
into the state set QU . This ensures the correct sequencing of
transitions in the FSM.
III. EXAMPLE
This section illustrates by an example how a function
call in MATLAB [5] code can be modeled as an EFSM.
The approach of the modelling is not to be considered as a
general method that could, or should, be applied to all types
of MATLAB-code, but rather how the modelling needed for
the specific code of interest was performed.
Consider the MATLAB code shown in Fig. 1. The code
consists of two functions f1 and f2. When f1 is called
the variable in is assigned a random value between one
and five, randi([1 5], 1, 1). Then, if in is larger than 3,
the output variable out is assigned in − 1, and if in is
smaller or equal to 3, f2 is called where the variable out is
assigned in+1. Fig. 2 shows the EFSM model of the code.
It uses the variables in and out with domain {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
and {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} respectively to represent the MATLAB
variables. The updates on the transitions match the statements
LSM
NoRequest
S1 S2
S3
S4
Finished
S5
Fig. 3. The high level lateral state manager; the locations keep track of
where in the process of the lane change the car is.
in the code. The transitions labeled with f1 and f2 represent
calling functions f1 and f2, respectively. The variable in is
assigned its random value in the update on the f1 transition.
IV. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND MODELING
This paper focuses on a part of the lane change module
called the lateral state manager. The implementation of the
lane change module is written in object oriented MATLAB-
code and simulations are made in the MATLAB/Simulink
environment.
A. Planner
The lane change module is implemented with the use
of several classes, all with different responsibilities. In this
paper, the class Planner is considered. Planner has the
responsibility to decide and control how the lane change
should be done. Planner is cyclically updated at a high
frequency with the current status of the vehicle, surrounding
traffic situation, and current reference signals. The reference
signals hold for example the current lane change request.
With this information, Planner returns a path and required
control signals to make a lane change in a safe and efficient
way. Since the task of Planner is to calculate a path for
the current inputs there is, with the exception of the lateral
state manager (see below), no need to use data from previous
updates.
B. Lateral state manager
Contrary to Planner, though, the Lateral State Manager
(LSM) has to keep track of where in the process of lane
change the car currently is, and thus it is implemented as a
state machine as depicted in Fig. 3.
This state machine consists of seven locations, two of
which are NoRequest and Finished. Each time that Planner
is updated, the current state of LSM is changed based on the
current location. Note that at most one transition can be fired
each time Planner is updated.
When no lane change is requested LSM should be in
NoRequest, which is also the initial state. Once a request
comes, LSM moves to S1, and from there to either S2, S3 or
back to NoRequest depending on the situation. Finally, when
the lane change is done LSM will be in Finished and from
there, on the next update, transit back to NoRequest.
call from Planner
updateState(. . . )
duringCurrentState(. . . )
state
changed?
terminate
enterNewState(. . . )
yes
no
Fig. 4. Flow chart showing the execution sequence of methods used in
lateral state manager.
C. Implementation
The implementation of LSM is done with a set of methods
and variables in Planner, where the current state is one of
the variables.
LSM consists of three different types of methods. The first
type, of which there is only one implementation, is called
updateState. This method is called from Planner every time
that Planner is updated. The purpose of the updateState
method is to call the current state’s duringUpdate method,
which is the second type of method; each state has its own
duringUpdate method, named like duringNoRequest. The
duringUpdate methods are where the decisions are taken
and different parts of the code are executed depending on
the inputs. Before the duringUpdate method terminates, it
will either change the state or keep the current state. In the
latter case, the same duringUpdate method will be called in
the next update. If the state is changed by the duringUpdate
method, the new state’s enterUpdate method is called, which
is the third type of method, before updateState is finished.
In contrast to the duringUpdate methods which are executed
repeatedly on each update while the state stays current,
the enterUpdate methods are executed only once when the
transition into the state occurs. This is illustrated by the flow
chart in Fig. 4.
Modeling LSM’s 223 lines of MATLAB-code in Suprem-
ica was done manually, similar to what is described in
Section III. This resulted in a single EFSM with 75 locations,
123 transitions, and 17 variables (14 Boolean, 2 three-valued,
and a 7-valued variable holding the current location). The
flattening of this EFSM plant model has 1 443 104 states
(using Supremica’s per-event compiler), since combinations
of the seventeen variables’ values in the locations are repre-
sented as different states in the FSM.
R
s0
s1 update : direction 6= request
update : direction 6= request
update : direction = request
update : direction = request
s2
Fig. 5. Specification describing that the direction variable should always
on each update be equal to the input parameter request.
V. SPECIFICATIONS
Two properties of the code modeled in the previous section
will be specified; that a lane change is always made to the
side, left or right, that is requested by Planner, and that some
variables that should be incremented at most once each cycle
are actually never incremented more than once.
A. Lane change request
LSM receives requests from Planner to change lane to
either left or right. Thus, it does make sense to make sure
that when a lane change is performed, it accords with the
currently active request. In practice this means to check if
the value of an internal variable, direction, and the incoming
request parameter could be different from each other for
two consecutive updates. A difference for one update would
probably be sufficient, but a difference that persists over
several updates would indicate that this was not only related
to variable initialization in the model, but actually a property
of the MATLAB-code. Fig. 5 shows R, the EFSM model of
the lane change request specification.
When R of Fig. 5 is in its initial state s0 and an update
occurs, then if direction and request have the same value,
R remains in s0, whereas if the values differ, R transits to
s1. When in s1, if on the update the variables now have the
same values, R transits back to s0. However, if the variables
again have different values, then R transits to s2. Now, from
s2 it is not possible to come back to the initial state, and so
R blocks in s2. The task of verification is to find whether
this blocking state is reachable from the initial state or not,
when R is synchronized with LSM.
B. Timer increment
In LSM there are three variables that are used as timers:
timer1, timer2 and timer3. These “timers” are really counters
that keep track of during how many consequtive updates
certain Boolean variables have been true, one timer for each
such variable. When the value of the variable is false, the
respective timer will be set to zero. When the value is true,
the timer should be incremented on each update.
To check that a timer is incremented at most once per
update, specifications for this were formulated for each of
the timers. Fig. 6 shows T , the EFSM model of the timer
specification. Just as in Fig. 5, the event update represents the
update call from Planner. The timerInc event represents that
the timer is incremented. If the timer is incremented and an
update occurs before the next increment, everything is fine.
But if two timer increments occur without an intermediate
update the specification blocks.
T
s0
s1
update
update
timerInctimerInc
s2
Fig. 6. Specification describing that a timer should be incremented not
more than once per update.
VI. VERIFICATION
Given the LSM model and the specifications R and T ,
the task of verification is now to determine whether the bad
states can be reached in LSM ‖R and LSM ‖T , respectively.
Due to the way that the specifications are formulated, the
bad states are unreachable if and only if the system is non-
blocking. Thus we are to verify whether LSM ‖ R and
LSM ‖ T are non-blocking or not. However, due to the
state-space explosion exhaustive enumeration of the states
is time consuming (though possible), so instead Supremica’s
compositional abstraction-based conflict check [11] is used.
A. Compositional approach
The notion of non-blocking concerns being able to al-
ways reach some marked state. This is formally defined for
FSM [12], [13], but using the flattening of an EFSM (Def. 5),
the notion can be directly applied also to EFSM.
Definition 6: An EFSM E is non-blocking if its mono-
lithic flattening U(E) is non-blocking.
Similarly, non-blocking can be defined for an EFSM sys-
tem E = {E1, . . . , En} (Def. 3), as its monolithic flattening
U(E) = U(E1 ‖ · · · ‖ En) being non-blocking.
In this paper, there are two EFSM systems, ER =
{LSM , R} and ET = {LSM , T}, and since LSM is itself
non-blocking, if ER or ET would be blocking, then it is
known that the blocking states are introduced by the specifi-
cation, and hence the specification is not fulfilled. However,
calculating the monolithic flattening of the EFSM system
when checking non-blocking leads to an (in the worst case)
exponential increase in the number of states; the monolithic
flattening of ER has 3 191 904 states, and ET has 1 256 608.
Thus, this should be avoided.
The compositional abstraction-based approach [11] avoids
the flattening of an EFSM system. Instead, at each step
the individual EFSMs are abstracted. When no more ab-
straction is possible, either some components are composed
(Def. 4) or some variables are partially unfolded, substituting
(Def. 1) some variables with possible values and creating
new EFSMs called variable EFSMs [11]. This procedure is
continued until it leads to a single FSM, which is an abstract
representation of the system, simple enough to be verified
monolithically by standard means.
Abstraction means removing redundancy, and an ab-
stracted component has less locations and/or transitions
compared to the original component. This requires that
the abstracted components relate properly to the original
components. For compositional non-blocking verification
this requires that the non-blocking property of the system
does not change after the abstraction. To that end, conflict
equivalence was introduced in [14], and [11] defines a variety
of conflict equivalent abstraction methods for EFSMs. These
all guarantee that the final abstracted system is non-blocking
if and only if the original system was.
When Supremica’s compositional non-blocking verifica-
tion algorithm (called Conflict check in the Supremica GUI)
finds a blocking state, it generates a counterexample. This is
a trace of events from the initial state to the blocking state.
The counterexample can then be investigated in Supremica’s
simulator, where it can also be simulated event by event, by
clicking on the events of the trace.
B. False positives
As the model is built manually, errors not present in the
code may be introduced into the model. A counterexample
for such an error is called a false positive. Thus, when a
counterexample is found, it must first be made sure that
this is not a false positive. One way to do this is to write
manually a unit-test that aims to trigger the issue in the actual
code. However, this may fail, maybe because some coupling
between variables is unknown, and then the validity of the
model has to be carefully checked. For the specifications in
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 counterexamples were found that could be
shown to exist in the actual code.
C. Verification of lane change request
With the lane change request specification of Fig. 5, the
global system LMS ||R has 3 191 904 reachable states. How-
ever, using the compositional approach the largest EFSM
encountered during the compositional approach has 102
locations and 315 transitions, and the algorithm terminates
in 0.07 seconds. The non-blocking verification showed that
the specification is violated. In fact, there are 1 033 440
blocking states, each of which represents a situation where
the direction of lane change has been different from the cur-
rent request for at least two consecutive updates. Supremica
returned a 34 events long counterexample to one of these bad
states, which indicated that when a first request was issued
to go, say right, and then a second request to go left was
issued in a later update, when LSM was in a specific region
of its state-space and without cancelling the first request in-
between, then the system entered a blocking state.
Since LSM is only a part of the lane change module it
was not obvious what this discrepancy between the variable
values could possibly lead to. Therefore, Supremica’s coun-
terexample guided the design of a unit-test. The unit-test
could also be visualized in a simulation environment used by
the developers to run and test the actual code. The unit-test
and simulations showed that for the counterexample scenario
the vehicle checked for traffic in the (left) lane that it was
supposed to change to according to the second request, but
when the traffic was clear on that side, the vehicle in fact
changed lane to the other (right) side in accordance with the
first request. Thus was shown the existence of the issue in
the actual code.
From the counterexample it seemed like that the problem
could possibly be solved by adding an extra transition from
S2 to NoRequest. Such a transition was added to the model.
Unfortunately, verifying the system again showed that the
problem had now moved to another region of the state-space.
Since this indicated that the problem was not just a slip
in one part, but probably a logical error that required an
extensive over-haul of the code, no further investigation was
made about finding solutions.
D. Verification of timers
With the timer increment specification, Fig. 6, the global
system has 1 256 608 reachable states. However, using the
compositional approach, for each of the three timers, the
largest EFSM encountered during the compositional ap-
proach has 102 locations and 169 transitions, and the algo-
rithm terminates in 0.06 seconds. The verification showed
that two of the timers, timer1 and timer2, were indeed
incremented not more than once on each update, but timer3
could in certain situations be incremented twice. In the worst
case, timer3 could thus hold a value representing double the
time that its corresponding Boolean variable was true.
With the help of the counterexample in Supremica it could
be shown that the root of the problem was that timer3 was
incremented not only in a duringUpdate method, but also in
an enterUpdate method. Thus, the increment of timer3 in the
enterUpdate method was removed in the Supremica model,
and the verification was performed once again. This showed
that the problem was solved and the code could easily be
corrected in the same way.
VII. CONCLUSION
Using an EFSM model of a part of the lane change module
for an autonomous vehicle, it was shown that unexpected
interactions between that module and the higher level tactical
decision module, such as first issuing a request and then
issuing a different request without cancelling the first request
in-between, resulted in incorrect behavior of the vehicle. This
error was shown to exist also in the actual code. Furthermore,
verification of suggested corrections to the problem showed
that the issue was not straightforwardly resolved but moved
to other parts of the system. Though this means that absence
of the error could not be shown, it still gave valuable input as
different fixes could be tried on the model before eventually
(and hopefully) finding one that did resolve the issue.
In addition it was shown that a variable counting the
number of updates, and which should be incremented only
once per cycle, could in fact be incremented more than once,
thus holding incorrect values. Here, formal verification did
show that the suggested correction for the counter indeed
removed that erroneous behavior.
Research is currently ongoing regarding how to incorpo-
rate these types of formal techniques into the daily engineer-
ing work flow. The two main obstacles being how to get the
model from the code, and finding the specifications, many
of which are not written down explicitly.
Future work includes the application of synthesis tech-
niques, where the model is algorithmically adjusted to be
guaranteed to fulfill the given specifications. The compo-
sitional synthesis feature of Supremica can do this, but
the result is due to the abstractions incomprehensible to
humans, and very hard (practically impossible) to relate back
to the original model. Thus, more research is needed here
concerning how to use the synthesis result in practice.
Further details, and other issues revealed by the verifica-
tion process, are reported in [15].
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